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Quantum cryptography has been recently ex-
tended to continuous variable systems, e.g., the
bosonic modes of the electromagnetic field. In
particular, several cryptographic protocols have
been proposed and experimentally implemented
using bosonic modes with Gaussian statistics.
Such protocols have shown the possibility of
reaching very high secret key rates, even in the
presence of strong losses in the quantum commu-
nication channel. Despite this robustness to loss,
their security can be affected by more general at-
tacks where extra Gaussian noise is introduced
by the eavesdropper. In this general scenario we
show a “hardware solution” for enhancing the
security thresholds of these protocols. This is
possible by extending them to a two-way quan-
tum communication where subsequent uses of the
quantum channel are suitably combined. In the
resulting two-way schemes, one of the honest par-
ties assists the secret encoding of the other with
the chance of a non-trivial superadditive enhance-
ment of the security thresholds. Such results en-
able the extension of quantum cryptography to
more complex quantum communications.
In recent years, quantum information has entered the
domain of continuous variable (CV) systems, i.e., quan-
tum systems described by an infinite dimensional Hilbert
space [1, 2]. So far, the most studied CV systems are the
bosonic modes, such as the optical modes of the electro-
magnetic field. In particular, the most important bosonic
states are the ones with Gaussian statistics, thanks to
their experimental accessibility and the relative simplic-
ity of their mathematical description [3, 4]. Accordingly,
quantum key distribution (QKD) has been extended to
this new framework [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21] and Gaussian cryptographic protocols
using coherent states have been shown to exploit fully the
potentialities of quantum optics [12, 16]. These coherent-
state protocols are robust with respect to the noise of the
quantum channel, as long as such noise can be ascribed to
pure losses [12, 16]. By contrast, their security is strongly
affected when channel losses are used to introduce a ther-
mal environment, which is assumed to be controlled by a
malicious eavesdropper [12, 22]. In this Gaussian eaves-
dropping scenario, we present a method to enhance the
security thresholds of the basic coherent-state protocols.
This is achieved by extending them to two-way quantum
communication protocols, where one of the honest par-
ties (Bob) uses its quantum resources to assist the secret
encoding of the other party (Alice). In particular, the
enhancement of security is proven to be effective since
the security thresholds are superadditive with respect to
the double use of the quantum channel. Such a result
is achieved when the Gaussian attack corresponds to a
memoryless Gaussian channel. More generally, we also
consider Gaussian channels with memory, therefore cre-
ating classical and/or quantum correlations between the
paths of the two-way quantum communication. In or-
der to overcome this kind of eavesdropping strategy, the
two-way protocols must be modified into suitable hybrid
protocols, which represent their safe formulation against
every kind of collective Gaussian attack.
ONE-WAY PROTOCOLS
In basic coherent-state protocols [11, 15], Alice pre-
pares a coherent state |α〉 whose amplitude α = (QA +
iPA)/2 is stochastically modulated by a pair of indepen-
dent Gaussian variables {QA, PA}, with zero mean and
variance V − 1. This variance determines the portion of
phase space which is available to Alice’s classical encod-
ing {QA, PA} and, therefore, quantifies the amount of
energy which Alice can use in the process. This energy
is usually assumed to be very large V ≫ 1 (large mod-
ulation limit) in order to reach the optimal and asymp-
totic performances provided by the infinite dimensional
Hilbert space. The modulated coherent state is then sent
to Bob through a quantum channel, whose noise is as-
sumed ascribable to the malicious action of a potential
eavesdropper (Eve). In a homodyne (Hom) protocol [11],
Bob detects the state via a single quadrature measure-
ment (i.e., by a homodyne detection). More exactly, Bob
randomly measures the quadrature Qˆ or Pˆ , getting a
real outcome XB = QB (or PB) which is correlated to
the encoded signal XA = QA (or PA). In a heterodyne
(Het) protocol [15], Bob performs a joint measurement
of Qˆ and Pˆ (i.e., a heterodyne detection). In such a
case, Bob decodes the R2-variable XB = {QB, PB} cor-
related to the total signal XA = {QA, PA} encoded in
2the amplitude α. In both cases, Alice and Bob finally
possess two correlated variables XA and XB, character-
ized by some mutual information I(XA : XB). In order
to access this mutual information, either Bob estimates
Alice’s encoding XA via a direct reconciliation (DR) or
Alice estimates Bob’s outcomes XB via a reverse recon-
ciliation (RR) [22]. However, in order to extract some
shared secret information from I(XA : XB), the honest
parties must estimate the noise of the channel by broad-
casting and comparing part of their data. In this way,
they are able to bound the information I(XA : E) or
I(XB : E) which has been potentially stolen by Eve dur-
ing the process. Then, the accessible secret information
is simply given by R◮ := I(XA : XB) − I(XA : E) for
DR and by R◭ := I(XA : XB)− I(XB : E) for RR. Such
secret information can be put in the form of a binary key
by slicing the phase space and adopting the standard
techniques of error correction and privacy amplification
[23]. In particular, Alice and Bob can extract a secret key
whenever the channel noise is less than certain security
thresholds, which correspond to the boundary conditions
R◮ = 0 and R◭ = 0.
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FIG. 1: Coherent state protocols. Alice prepares a coherent
state |α〉 that Bob detects via a homodyne or heterodyne
detector. A Gaussian (entangling cloner) attack by Eve is also
shown. Note that preparing a coherent state (via modulating
the vacuum) can be equivalently achieved by heterodyning
one of the two modes of an EPR pair.
In the CV framework, collective Gaussian attacks rep-
resent the most powerful tool that today can be han-
dled in the cryptoanalysis of Gaussian state protocols
[24, 25, 26, 27]. In the most general definition of a collec-
tive attack, all the quantum systems used by Alice and
Bob in a single run of the protocol are made to interact
with a fresh ancillary system prepared by Eve. Then, all
the output ancillas, coming from a large number of such
single-run interactions, are subject to a final coherent
measurement that is furthermore optimized upon all of
Alice and Bob’s classical communications. In particular,
the collective attack is Gaussian if the single-run interac-
tions are Gaussian, i.e., corresponding to unitaries that
preserve the Gaussian statistics of the states. Notice that
for standard one-way QKD, a single run of the protocol
corresponds to a single use of the channel. As a conse-
quence, every collective Gaussian attack against one-way
protocols results in a memoryless channel and, therefore,
can be called a one-mode Gaussian attack. Since the
quadratures encode independent variables {QA, PA}, the
single-run Gaussian interactions do not need to mix the
quadratures [24, 25, 28, 29]. As a consequence, the Gaus-
sian interaction can be modelled by an entangling cloner
[12] (see Fig. 1) where a beam splitter (of transmission T )
mixes each signal mode A with an ancillary mode E be-
longing to an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair (see
Appendix). Such an EPR pair is characterized by a vari-
ance W and correlates the two output ancillary modes
E′, E′′ to be detected in the final coherent measurement.
Notice that, from the point of view of Alice and Bob,
this EPR pair simply reduces to an environmental ther-
mal state ρE with thermal number n¯E = (W − 1)/2.
A one-mode Gaussian attack can be therefore described
by two parameters: transmission T and variance W or,
equivalently, by T and N := (W −1)(1−T )T−1, the lat-
ter being the excess noise of the channel. This parameter
quantifies the amount of extra noise which is not refer-
able to losses, i.e., the effect of the thermal noise scaled
by the transmission [12]. The security thresholds against
these powerful attacks can be expressed in terms of toler-
able excess noise {N◮, N◭} versus the transmission T of
the channel. For protocols Hom and Het, these thresh-
olds are displayed in Fig. 2 for DR and Fig. 3 for RR, and
they confirm the results previously found in Refs. [31, 32]
(see Appendix).
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FIG. 2: Security thresholds in direct reconciliation. The figure
shows the tolerable excess noise N◮ (in quantum shot-noise
units) versus transmission T . Curves compare the various
one-way and two-way protocols against one-mode Gaussian
attacks {N,T} in the limit of large modulation (V → +∞).
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FIG. 3: Security thresholds in reverse reconciliation. The
figure shows the tolerable excess noise N◭ (in quantum shot-
noise units) versus transmission T . Curves compare the in-
dividual one-way and two-way protocols against one-mode
Gaussian attacks {N, T} in the limit of large modulation
(V → +∞).
FROM ONE-WAY TO TWO-WAY PROTOCOLS
The above coherent state protocols have been sim-
ply formulated in terms of prepare and measure (PM)
schemes. Equivalently, they can be formulated as
entanglement-based schemes, where Alice and Bob ex-
tract a key from the correlated outcomes of the measure-
ments made upon two entangled modes (see Fig. 1). In
fact, heterodyning one of the two entangled modes of an
EPR pair (with variance V ) is equivalent to remotely
preparing a coherent state |α〉 whose amplitude is ran-
domly modulated by a Gaussian (with variance V − 1)
[22]. In this dual representation of the protocol, Al-
ice owns a physical resource which can be equivalently
seen as an amount of energy ∼ V for modulation (in
the PM representation) or as an amount of entanglement
∼ log 2V to be distributed (in the entanglement-based
representation). Because of this equivalence, the previ-
ous entanglement is also called virtual [22]. In the above
one-way protocols, all these physical resources are the
monopoly of Alice and their sole purpose is the encod-
ing of secret information. However, we can also consider
a scenario where these resources are symmetrically dis-
tributed between Alice and Bob, and part of them is
used to assist the encoding. This is achieved by combin-
ing Alice and Bob in a two-way quantum communication
where Bob’s physical resources, to be generally intended
as entanglement resources, assist the secret encoding of
Alice, which is realized by unitary random modulations
(see Fig. 4).
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FIG. 4: General structure of the one-way, two-way and hy-
brid protocols, together with their possible collective attacks.
Circles and squares represent the physical resources available
in the process. In particular, circles represent entanglement
(possibly virtual) while squares are unitary modulations. In
the inset (a), the basic one-way scheme is depicted, where all
the resources are owned by Alice. In the insets (b) and (c),
the physical resources are instead distributed between Alice
and Bob, where Bob uses them for assisting while Alice for
encoding (two-way scheme). Inset (d) shows the hybrid proto-
col where one-way’s (OFF) and two-way’s (ON) are randomly
switched. All the insets also display Eve’s collective attacks.
The inset (a) shows the collective attacks against one-way
protocols (one-mode attacks). The insets (b) and (c) show
instead the collective attacks against the two-way protocols.
These are one-mode (or reducible two-mode) in the inset (b)
while two-mode in the inset (c). Finally, inset (d) shows the
effects of a two-mode attack on the hybrid protocol.
Let us explicitly construct such a two-way quan-
tum communication. In simple two-way generalizations,
Hom2 andHet2, of the previous one-way protocols,Hom
and Het, Bob exploits an assisting EPR pair (with vari-
ance V ) of which he keeps one mode B1 while sending the
other to Alice (see Fig. 5). Then, Alice encodes her infor-
mation via Gaussian modulation (with variance V − 1)
by adding a stochastic amplitude α = (QA + iPA)/2 to
the received mode. Such a mode is then sent back to
Bob, where it is detected together with the unsent mode
B1. Depending on the protocol, Bob will perform dif-
ferent detections on modes B1 and B2. In particular, for
the Hom2 protocol, Bob will detect the Qˆ (or Pˆ ) quadra-
ture of such modes (homodyne detections), while, for the
Het2 protocol, he will detect both Qˆ and Pˆ (heterodyne
detections). From the outcomes, Bob will finally con-
struct an optimal estimator XB of Alice’s corresponding
variable XA, equal to QA (or PA) for Hom
2 and to the
R
2-vector {QA, PA} for Het2.
Since Bob’s decoding strategy consists in individual
incoherent detections, these entanglement-assisted QKD
schemes are actually equivalent to two-way schemes with-
out entanglement, where Bob stochastically prepares a
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FIG. 5: Two-way quantum communication scheme. Bob ex-
ploits an EPR pair to assist Alice’s encoding. He keeps one
mode B1 while sending the other one C1 to Alice who, in turn,
perfoms a stochastic phase-space displacement +α. The re-
sulting mode A2 is then sent back to Bob. The final modes
B1 and B2 are incoherently detected by means of two homo-
dyne detectors (Hom2 protocol) or two heterodyne detectors
(Het2 protocol). The figure also displays a one-mode Gaus-
sian attack, where the forward mode C1 (from Bob to Alice)
and the backward one A2 (from Alice to Bob) are subject to
the action of entangling cloners.
quantum state to be sequentially transmitted forward
and backward in the channel. In fact, one can assume
that Bob detects B1 at the beginning of the quantum
communication, so that the travelling mode C1 is ran-
domly prepared in a reference quantum state (which is
squeezed for Hom2 and coherent for Het2). This refer-
ence state reaches Alice where stores the encoding trans-
formation and, then, is finally detected by the second de-
coding measurement of Bob. Therefore, if we restrict Bob
to incoherent detections (classical Bob), then the two-
way schemes also possess a dual representation, where
the assisting entanglement resource is actually virtual,
i.e., can be replaced by an equivalent random modula-
tion. In this dual (entanglement-free) representation, the
advantage brought by the two-way quantum communica-
tion can be understood in terms of an iterated use of the
uncertainty principle, where Eve is forced to produce a
double perturbation of the same quantum channel. For
instance, let us consider the Het2 protocol in the absence
of eavesdropping. By heterodyning mode B1, Bob ran-
domly prepares mode C1 in a reference coherent state |β〉
containing a random modulation γ known only to him.
Then, Alice transforms this state into another coherent
state |α+ β〉 which is sent back to Bob. By the subse-
quent heterodyne detection, Bob is able to estimate the
total amplitude α + β and, therefore, to infer the signal
α from his knowledge of β. If we now insert Eve in this
scenario, we see that she must estimate both the refer-
ence β and the masked signal α+β in order to access the
signal α. This implies attacking both the forward and
the backward channel (see Fig. 5) and, since the noise
of the first attack will perturb the second attack, we ex-
pect a non trivial security improvement in the process.
Such an effect intuitively holds under the assumption of
one-mode attacks (where the two paths are attacked in-
coherently) and it is indeed confirmed by our analysis.
Quantitatively, we have tested the security performances
of the two-way protocols against the one-mode Gaussian
attacks {N,T } and the corresponding security thresh-
olds N◮,◭ = N◮,◭(T ) are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3
(see Appendix). For the two-way protocols, such thresh-
olds relate the tolerable excess noise to the transmission
in each use of the channel and, therefore, they are di-
rectly comparable with the thresholds of the correspond-
ing one-way protocols. By comparing Hom2 with Hom
and Het2 with Het, one sees that the security thresh-
olds are improved almost everywhere (the only exception
being Hom2 for T > Tc ≃ 0.86 in DR). Such a superad-
ditive behavior is the central result of this work. Roughly
speaking, even if two communication lines (e.g., two op-
tical fibers) are too noisy for one-way QKD, they can
be combined to enable a two-way QKD, as long as the
quantum channel is memoryless.
In order to deepen our analysis on superadditivity, we
also tested the previous one-way and two-way protocols
when a classical Bob is replaced by a quantum Bob.
This means that Bob is no longer limited to incoher-
ent detections but can access a quantum memory storing
all the modes involved in the quantum communication.
Then, Bob performs a final optimal coherent measure-
ment on all these modes in order to retrieve Alice’s infor-
mation. Such a coherent measurement can be disjoint,
i.e., designed to estimate a single quadrature for each en-
coding, or joint, i.e., designed to estimate both quadra-
tures. Correspondingly, the modified one-way and two-
way protocols will be denoted by ⊗Hom, ⊗Het, ⊗Hom2
and ⊗Het2. Notice that these collective protocols may
not admit an equivalent entanglement-free representa-
tion (where Bob’s entanglement is replaced by a random
modulation) if Bob’s coherent measurement cannot be re-
duced to incoherent detection. The corresponding secu-
rity thresholds are shown in Fig. 2 (only DR can be com-
pared, see Appendix). It is evident that superadditivity
holds almost everywhere also for these collective schemes,
the only exception being ⊗Hom2 above the same critical
value Tc as before. We easily note that ⊗Hom coincides
with Hom, while ⊗Hom2 coincides with Hom2. Then,
in the case of disjoint decoding, the optimal coherent
measurement asymptotically coincides with a sequence of
incoherent homodyne detections. As a consequence, the
collective protocols (⊗Hom and ⊗Hom2) collapse to the
corresponding individual protocols (Hom and Hom2),
where there is no need for a quantum memory. In partic-
ular, this proves that ⊗Hom2 admits an entanglement-
free representation where infinitely-squeezed states are
5sent to Alice through the forward path, and are then ho-
modyned at the output of the backward path. The usage
of quantum memories does better in the case of joint de-
coding, since ⊗Het and ⊗Het2 have much better perfor-
mances than the corresponding individual protocols Het
and Het2. As a consequence, no simple entanglement-
free representation is known for ⊗Het2.
HYBRID PROTOCOLS
We remark that our previous quantitative cryptoanal-
ysis concerns one-mode Gaussian attacks, which are the
cryptographic analog of a memoryless Gaussian channel.
However, when a multi-way scheme is considered, a sin-
gle run of the protocol no longer corresponds to a single
use of the channel. As a consequence, the most general
collective attack against a multi-way scheme, even if in-
coherent between separate runs, may involve quantum
correlations between different channels. In general, an
arbitrary collective attack against a two-way scheme can
be called a two-mode attack. This is the general scenario
of Fig. 4(c) where the action of this attack on a single
round-trip of quantum communication is given by an ar-
bitrary map E2. On the one hand, such an attack is said
to be reducible to a one-mode attack if the map can be
symmetrically decomposed as E2 = E ◦ E (i.e., the attack
can be described by the scenario of Fig. 4(b)) On the
other hand, the two-mode attack is called irreducible if
E2 6= E ◦ E (i.e., the attack of Fig. 4(c) cannot be de-
scribed by Fig. 4(b)). The latter situation includes all
attacks where some kind of correlation is exploited be-
tween the two paths, either if this correlation is classical
(so that E2 = E2 ◦ E1 with E1 6= E2) or truly quantum (so
that E2 6= E2 ◦ E1 for every E1 and E2).
In order to detect and handle an irreducible attack,
the previous two-way protocols, Hom2 and Het2, must
be modified into hybrid forms that we denote by Hom1,2
and Het1,2. In this hybrid formulation, Alice randomly
switches between a two-way scheme and the correspond-
ing one-way scheme, where she simply detects the incom-
ing mode and sends a new one back to Bob. We may de-
scribe this process by saying that Alice randomly closes
(ON) and opens (OFF) the quantum communication cir-
cuit with Bob, the effective switching sequence being
communicated at the end of the protocol (see Fig. 4(d)).
By publicizing part of the exchanged data, Alice and Bob
can perform tomography of the quantum channels in both
the ON and OFF configurations. In particular, they can
reconstruct the channel E2 affecting the two-way trip and
the channels E1 and E2 affecting the forward and back-
ward paths (see Fig. 4(d)). Then, they can check the
reducibility conditions E1 = E2 and E2 = E2 ◦ Eα ◦ E1,
where Eα(ρ) = Dˆ(α)ρDˆ†(α) is Alice’s publicized encod-
ing map. If such conditions are satisfied then the two-
mode attack is reducible, i.e., Alice and Bob have ex-
cluded every kind of quantum and classical correlation
between the two paths of the quantum communication
(see Appendix for an explicit description). In such a
case, the honest users can therefore exploit the superad-
ditivity of the two-way quantum communication. If the
previous reducibility conditions are not met, then the
honest users can always exploit the instances of one-way
quantum communication. Notice that the verification of
the reducibility conditions is rather easy in the Gaussian
case, where the channels can be completely reconstructed
by analyzing the first and second statistical moments of
the output states. Also notice that the reducibility con-
ditions exclude every kind of quantum impersonation at-
tack [33], where Eve short-circuits the channels of the
two-way quantum communication.
In conclusion, the hybrid protocols constitute a safe
implementation of two-way protocols, at least in the pres-
ence of collective Gaussian attacks (one-mode or two-
mode). In the hybrid formulation, Alice and Bob can
in fact optimize their security on both one-way and two-
way quantum communication. The ON-OFF manipula-
tion of the quantum communication can be interpreted
as if Alice had two orthogonal bases to choose from dur-
ing the key distribution process. In the presence of this
randomization, Eve is not able to optimize her Gaussian
attack with respect to both kinds of quantum commu-
nication and the trusted parties can always make the a
posteriori optimal choice. As a natural development of
these results, one can consider a situation where Bob also
performs a random and independent ON-OFF manipu-
lation of the quantum communication. Such a scheme
naturally leads to instances of n-way quantum commu-
nication (with n > 2) whose security properties would
be interesting to inspect in future work. In general, our
results pave the way for future investigations in the do-
main of secure multiple quantum communications, where
quantum communication circuits can in principle grow to
higher and higher complexity.
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APPENDIX
In this technical section, we first review some basic in-
formation about Gaussian states. Then, we exhibit the
6general expressions for the secret-key rates (in both direct
and reverse reconciliation) when the various protocols are
subject to one-mode Gaussian attacks. In the following
subsections, we explicitly compute these secret-key rates
for all the one-way and two-way protocols. From these
quantities we derive the security thresholds shown in the
paper. Finally, in the last subsection, we give the ex-
plicit description of a general two-mode attack and we
analyze the conditions for its reducibility. This last anal-
ysis shows the security of the hybrid protocols against
collective Gaussian attacks.
Basics of Gaussian states
A bosonic system of n modes can be described by a
quadrature row-vector Yˆ := (Qˆ1, Pˆ1, . . . , Qˆn, Pˆn) satis-
fying [Yˆl, Yˆm] = 2iΩlm (1 ≤ l,m ≤ 2n), where
Ω :=
n⊕
k=1
(
0 1
−1 0
)
(1)
defines a symplectic form. A bosonic state ρ is called
Gaussian if its statistics is Gaussian [3, 4]. In such a
case, the state ρ is fully characterized by its displacement
〈Yˆ〉 = Tr(Yˆρ) and correlation matrix (CM) V, whose
generic element is defined by Vlm := 〈YˆlYˆm + YˆmYˆl〉/2−
〈Yˆl〉〈Yˆm〉 with diagonal terms Vll = 〈Yˆ 2l 〉−〈Yˆl〉2 := V (Yˆl)
express the variances of the quadratures. According to
Williamson’s theorem [34], every CM V can be put in
diagonal form by means of a symplectic transformation,
i.e., there exists a matrix S, satisfying STΩS = Ω, such
that STVS = ∆(ν1, ν1, · · · , νn, νn), where ∆ denotes a
diagonal matrix. The set of real values ν := {ν1, · · · , νn}
is called symplectic eigenspectrum of the CM and pro-
vides compact ways to express fundamental properties
of the corresponding Gaussian state. In particular, the
Von Neumann entropy S(ρ) := −Tr (ρ log ρ) of a Gaus-
sian state ρ can be expressed in terms of the symplectic
eigenvalues by the formula [35]
S(ρ) =
n∑
k=1
g(νk) , (2)
where
g(ν) := ν+12 log
ν+1
2 − ν−12 log ν−12
→ log eν2 +O(ν−1) for ν ≫ 1 . (3)
Here, the information unit is the bit if log = log2 or the
nat if log = ln.
An example of a Gaussian state is the two-mode
squeezed vacuum state [30] (or EPR source) whose CM
takes the form
VEPR(V ) =
(
V I
√
V 2 − 1Z√
V 2 − 1Z V I
)
, (4)
where Z := ∆(1,−1) and I := ∆(1, 1). In Eq. (4) the
variance V fully characterizes the EPR source [30]. On
the one hand, it quantifies the amount of entanglement
which is distributed between Alice and Bob, providing a
log-negativity [36] equal to
EN = max
{
0,− 12 log(2V 2 − 1− 2V
√
V 2 − 1)
}
→ log 2V +O(V −2) for V ≫ 1 . (5)
On the other hand, it quantifies the amount of energy
which is distributed to the parties, since the reduced ther-
mal states ρA := TrB(ρ) and ρB := TrA(ρ) have mean
excitation numbers equal to (V − 1)/2.
General expressions for the secret-key rates
The various protocols differ for the number of paths
(1 or 2) and the decoding method, which can be joint,
disjoint, individual or collective. In particular, when de-
coding is disjoint the relevant secret variable X is Q ∈ R
(or P ∈ R, equivalently). When decoding is joint, the
relevant secret variable X is {Q,P} ∈ R2. Under the
assumption of one-mode Gaussian attacks, the individ-
ual protocols (Hom,Het,Hom2, Het2) have the follow-
ing secret-key rates for DR (◮) and RR (◭) [37, 38]
R◮ := I(XA : XB)− I(XA : E) , (6)
R◭ := I(XA : XB)− I(XB : E) . (7)
In these formulae, I(XA : XB) := H(XB)−H(XB|XA) is
the classical mutual information between Alice and Bob’s
variables XA and XB, with H(XB) = (1/2) logV (XB)
and H(XB|XA) = (1/2) logV (XB|XA) being the total
and conditional Shannon entropies [39]. The term
I(XK : E) := H(E)−H(E|XK) (8)
is the Holevo information [40] between Eve (E) and
the honest user K = A,B (i.e., Alice or Bob). Here,
H(E) := S(ρE) is the Von Neumann entropy of Eve’s
state ρE andH(E|XK) is the Von Neumann entropy con-
ditioned to the classical communication of XK . For the
collective protocols (⊗Hom,⊗Het,⊗Hom2,⊗Het2) we
have instead
R◮ := I(XA : B)− I(XA : E) , (9)
and
R◭ := I(XA : B)− I(B : E) , (10)
where I(XA : B), I(XA : E) are Holevo informations,
and
I(B : E) := H(B) +H(E)−H(B,E) (11)
7is the quantum mutual information between Bob and
Eve. By setting R = 0 in the above Eqs. (6), (7), (9)
and (10) one finds the security thresholds for the corre-
sponding protocols. Notice that the Holevo information
of Eq. (8) provides an upper bound to Eve’s accessible
information. In the case of collective protocols, Alice
and Bob are able to reach the Holevo bound I(XA : B)
only asymptotically. This is possible if Alice communi-
cates to Bob the optimal collective measurement to be
made compatible with the generated sequence of signal
states and the detected noise in the channel. Such a
measurement will be an asymptotic projection on the
codewords of a random quantum code as foreseen by
the Holevo–Schumacher–Westmoreland (HSW) theorem
[41, 42]. Though such a measurement is highly complex,
it is in principle possible and the study of the collective
DR secret-key rate of Eq. (9) does make sense (it is also
connected to the notion of private classical capacity of
Ref. [43]). On the other hand, the quantum mutual in-
formation of Eq. (11) provides a bound which is too large
in general, preventing a comparison between the collec-
tive protocols in RR.
Secret-key rates of the one-way protocols
In the one-way protocols, Alice encodes two inde-
pendent Gaussian variables QA, PA in the quadratures
QˆA, PˆA of a signal mode A, i.e., QˆA = QA+ QˆA|QA and
PˆA = PA + PˆA|PA. Here, the quantum variables QˆA, PˆA
have a global modulation V , given by the sum of the
classical modulation V (QA) = V (PA) = V − 1 and the
quantum shot-noise V (QˆA|QA) = V (PˆA|PA) = 1. On
the other hand, Eve has an EPR sourceVEPR(W ) which
distributes entanglement between modes E and E′′. The
spy mode E is then mixed with the signal mode A via a
beam splitter of transmission T , and the output modes,
B and E′, are received by Eve and Bob, respectively (see
Fig. 1). Let us first consider the case of collective pro-
tocols (⊗Hom,⊗Het), where Bob performs a coherent
detection on all the collected modes B in order to decode
XA = QA (for ⊗Hom) or XA = {QA, PA} (for ⊗Het).
For an arbitrary triplet {V,W, T }, the quadratures of the
output modes, B and E′, have variances
V (QˆB) = V (PˆB) = (1 − T )W + TV := bV , (12)
V (QˆE′) = V (PˆE′) = (1− T )V + TW := eV , (13)
and conditional variances
V (QˆB|QA) = V (PˆB |PA) = (1− T )W + T = b1 , (14)
V (QˆE′ |QA) = V (PˆE′ |PA) = (1− T ) + TW = e1 . (15)
Globally, the CMs of the output states ρB (of Bob),
ρE′E′′ := ρE (of Eve) and ρE′E′′B := ρEB (of Eve and
Bob) are given by
VB(V, V ) =∆(bV , bV ) , (16)
VE(V, V ) =
(
∆[eV , eV ] ϕZ
ϕZ W I
)
, (17)
and
VEB =
(
VE F
FT VB
)
, F : =
(
µI
θZ
)
, (18)
where
ϕ := [T (W 2−1)]1/2 , µ := (W −V )[(1−T )T ]1/2 , (19)
and
θ := [(1− T )(W 2 − 1)]1/2 . (20)
The CMs of Bob (B) and Eve (E), conditioned to Alice’s
variable XA, are instead equal to
VK|QA = VK(1, V ) , VK|QA,PA = VK(1, 1) , (21)
whereK = B,E. For T 6= 0, 1 and V ≫ 1, the symplectic
spectra of all the previous CMs are given by:
νB → {TV } , (22)
νB|QA → {
√
b1TV } , (23)
νB|QA,PA → {b1} , (24)
νE → {(1− T )V,W} , (25)
νE|QA → {
√
e1(1− T )V ,
√
Wb1/e1} , (26)
νE|QA,PA → {b1, 1} , (27)
νBE → {V, 1, 1} . (28)
By using Eqs. (2) and (3), we then compute all the Von
Neumann entropies to be used in the quantities I(XA :
B), I(XA : E) and I(B : E) of Eqs. (9) and (10). After
some algebra we get the following asymptotic rates for
the one-way collective protocols
R◮[⊗Het] = log T1−T − g(W ) , (29)
R◮[⊗Hom] = 12 log Te1(1−T )b1 +g
(√
Wb1
e1
)
−g(W ) , (30)
and
R◭[⊗Het] = log 11−T − g(W )− g(b1) , (31)
while R◭[⊗Hom]→ −∞, because of the too large bound
provided by I(B : E) in this case.
Let us now consider the individual one-way protocols
(Hom,Het). Bob’s output variable is QB = QˆB for
Hom, and
{QB, PB} = 2−1/2{QˆB + Qˆ0, PˆB − Pˆ0} (32)
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Eqs. (12) and (14), we can calculate the variances V (XB)
and V (XB|XA) that provide the non-computed term
I(XA : XB) in Eq. (6). Then, we get the following
asymptotic rates in DR
R◮[Hom] = R◮[⊗Hom] , (33)
and
R◮[Het] = log 2Te(1−T )(1+b1) + g(b1)− g(W ) . (34)
In order to derive the RR rates from Eq. (7) we must
evaluate
I(XB : E) = H(E)−H(E|XB) , (35)
where H(E|XB) is computed from the spectrum νE|XB
of the conditional CM VE|XB . In RR, Eve’s quantum
variables
YˆE := (QˆE′ , PˆE′ , QˆE′′ , PˆE′′) (36)
must be conditioned to the Bob’s classical variable XB.
This is equivalent to constructing, from XB, the optimal
linear estimators Yˆ
(XB)
E of YˆE , in such a way that the
residual conditional variables
YˆE |XB := YˆE − Yˆ (XB)E (37)
have minimal entropy H(E|XB). For the Hom protocol,
Bob’s variable XB = QB can be used to estimate the Qˆ
quadratures only. Then, let Bob estimate YˆE by
Yˆ
(QB)
E = (q
′QB, 0, q
′′QB, 0) , (38)
so that the conditional variables are given by
YˆE |QB = (QˆE′ − q′QB, PˆE′ , QˆE′′ − q′′QB, PˆE′′) . (39)
For T 6= 0, 1 and V ≫ 1, the optimal estimators are given
by
q′ = −
√
(1− T )/T , (40)
and q′′ = 0. The corresponding conditional spectrum
νE|QB → {
√
VW (1 − T )/T, 1} (41)
minimizes H(E|QB) and leads to the asymptotic rate
R◭[Hom] = 12 log
W
(1−T )b1
− g(W ) . (42)
For the Het protocol, Bob’s variable XB = {QB, PB}
enables him to estimate both the Qˆ and Pˆ quadrature,
by constructing the YˆE-linear estimator
Yˆ
(QB ,PB)
E = (q
′QB, p
′PB, q
′′QB, p
′′PB) . (43)
For T 6= 0, 1 and V ≫ 1, the optimal choice corresponds
to
q′ = p′ = −
√
2(1− T )/T , (44)
and q′′ = p′′ = 0, which gives
νE|QB ,PB → {(1− T + b1)/T, 1} , (45)
and leads to the asymptotic rate
R◭[Het] = log 2Te(1−T )(1+b1) + g
(
1−T+b1
T
)− g(W ) . (46)
Secret-key rates of the two-way protocols
In the EPR formulation of the two-way protocols (see
Fig. 5), Bob assists the encoding via an EPR source
VEPR(V ) that distributes entanglement between mode
B1, which is kept, and mode C1, which is sent in the
channel and undergoes the action of an entangling cloner
(T,W ) : C1 → A1. On the perturbed mode A1, Alice
performs a Gaussian modulation by adding a stochastic
amplitude α = (QA+ iPA)/2 with V (QA) = V (PA) = V¯
and 〈QAPA〉 = 0. The modulated mode A2 is then sent
back through the channel, where it undergoes the ac-
tion of a second entangling cloner (T,W ) : A2 → B2,
where the output mode B2 is finally received by Bob.
Let us first consider the collective two-way protocols
(⊗Hom2,⊗Het2), where Bob performs an optimal co-
herent measurement upon all the collected modes B1, B2
in order to decode XA = QA (for ⊗Hom2) or XA =
{QA, PA} (for ⊗Het2). For an arbitrary quadruplet
{V¯ , V,W, T }, the CMs of the output states ρB1B2 := ρB
(of Bob) and ρE′
1
E′′
1
E′
2
E′′
2
:= ρE (of Eve) are given by
VB(V¯ , V¯ ) =
(
V I T
√
V 2 − 1Z
T
√
V 2 − 1Z ΛB(V¯ , V¯ )
)
, (47)
and
VE(V¯ , V¯ ) =


eV I ϕZ µ
′I 0
ϕZ W I θ′Z 0
µ′I θ′Z ΛE(V¯ , V¯ ) ϕZ
0 0 ϕZ W I

 , (48)
where
ΛB(V¯ , V¯ ) := [T
2V + (1 − T 2)W ]I+ T∆(V¯ , V¯ ) , (49)
and
ΛE(V¯ , V¯ ) := γI+(1−T )∆(V¯ , V¯ ) , (50)
with
µ′ := −
√
1− Tµ , θ′ := −
√
1− Tθ , (51)
and
γ := T (1− T )V + (1− T )2W + TW . (52)
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variable XA, are instead equal to
VK|QA = VK(0, V¯ ) , VK|QA,PA = VK(0, 0) , (53)
for K = B,E. Let us consider identical resources be-
tween Alice and Bob, i.e., V¯ = V − 1. Then, for T 6= 0, 1
and V ≫ 1, all the symplectic spectra are given by:
νB → {f1V, f2V } , (54)
νB|QA → {ςV, ς−1
√
T (1− T 2)WV } , (55)
νB|QA,PA → {(1− T 2)V,W} , (56)
νE → {h1V, h2V,W,W} , (57)
νE|QA → {υ(1− T )V,
√
(1−T 2)WV
υ ,W, 1} , (58)
νE|QA,PA → {(1− T 2)V,W, 1, 1} , (59)
where f1f2 = T , h1h2 = (1− T )2 and
ς := [1+T 2(T 2+T−2)]1/2 , υ := [1+3T+T 2]1/2 . (60)
By means of Eqs. (2) and (3), we compute all the Von
Neumann entropies to be used in Eq. (9), and we get the
asymptotic rates
R◮[⊗Hom2] = 12 log T(1−T )2 − g(W ) , (61)
and
R◮[⊗Het2] = 2R◮[⊗Hom2] . (62)
Clearly these rates imply the same DR threshold N◮ =
N◮(T ) for ⊗Hom2 and ⊗Het2, as is shown in Fig. 2.
The derivation of R◭[⊗Het2] and R◭[⊗Hom2] is here
omitted because of the trivial negative divergence caused
by I(B : E).
Let us now consider the individual two-way protocols
Hom2 and Het2 in DR. For the Hom2 protocol, Bob
decodes QA by constructing the output variable QB :=
QB2−TQB1 from the measurements of QˆB1 and QˆB2 . In
fact, since QˆB1 → QˆC1 (for V ≫ 1) and
QˆB2 =
√
TQA+T QˆC1 +
√
1− T (
√
TQˆE1 + QˆE2) , (63)
we asymptotically have
QB →
√
TQA + δQ , (64)
with
δQ :=
√
1− T (
√
TQˆE1 + QˆE2) . (65)
From V (QB) and V (QB|QA) we easily compute I(QA :
QB) to be used in Eq. (6). It is then easy to check that
the asymptotic DR rate satisfies
R◮[Hom2] = R◮[⊗Hom2] . (66)
For the Het2 protocol, Bob measures
{
qˆ− = 2
−1/2(QˆB1 − Qˆ0) ,
pˆ+ = 2
−1/2(PˆB1 + Pˆ0) ,
(67)
from the first heterodyne on B1, and{
Qˆ− = 2
−1/2(QˆB2 − Qˆ0′) ,
Pˆ+ = 2
−1/2(PˆB2 + Pˆ0′) ,
(68)
from the second one upon B2. Then, Bob decodes
{QA, PA} via the variables{
QB := Q− − Tq− ,
PB := P+ + Tp+ .
(69)
In fact, for T 6= 0, 1 and V ≫ 1, we have
QB →
√
T/2QA + δQ
′ , PB →
√
T/2PA + δP , (70)
with
δQ′ := 2−1/2(δQ+ T Qˆ0 − Qˆ0′) , (71)
and
δP := 2−1/2[
√
1− T (
√
T PˆE1 + PˆE2)+T Pˆ0 + Pˆ0′ ] . (72)
From V (XB) = V (QB)V (PB) and V (XB|XA) =
V (QB|QA)V (PB|PA) we then compute I(XA : XB) and
the consequent asymptotic DR rate
R◮[Het2] = log 2T (1+T )e(1−T )[1+T 2+(1−T 2)W ] − g(W ) . (73)
Let us now consider Hom2 and Het2 in RR. In or-
der to derive the corresponding rates from Eq. (7), we
must again compute H(E|XB) from the spectrum of the
conditional CM VE|XB , where Eve’s quantum variables
YˆE := (QˆE′
1
, PˆE′
1
, QˆE′′
1
, PˆE′′
1
, QˆE′
2
, PˆE′
2
, QˆE′′
2
, PˆE′′
2
) (74)
are conditioned to Bob’s output variable XB. Of course,
this is again equivalent to finding the optimal linear es-
timators Yˆ
(XB)
E of YˆE . For the Hom
2 protocol where
XB = QB, the linear estimators of YˆE take the form
Yˆ
(QB)
E := (q
′
1QB, 0, q
′′
1QB, 0, q
′
2QB, 0, q
′′
2QB, 0) . (75)
For T 6= 0, 1 and V ≫ 1, the optimal ones are given
by q′1 = q
′′
1 = q
′′
2 = 0 and q
′
2 = −
√
(1− T )/T . The
corresponding conditional spectrum is given by
νE|QB → {m1V,m2
√
V ,W, 1} , (76)
with
m1m2 = [T
−1(1− T )3(1 + T 3)W ]1/2 . (77)
This leads to the asymptotic rate
R◭[Hom2] = 12 log
1−T+T 2
(1−T )2 − g(W ) . (78)
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For the Het2 protocol, where XB = {QB, PB}, we have
Yˆ
(QB ,PB)
E :=
(q′1QB, p
′
1PB , q
′′
1QB, p
′′
1PB, q
′
2QB, p
′
2PB , q
′′
2QB, p
′′
2PB) .
(79)
For T 6= 0, 1 and V ≫ 1, the optimal estimators are given
by
q′2 = p
′
2 = −
√
2(1− T )/T , (80)
and
q′1 = p
′
1 = q
′′
1 = p
′′
1 = q
′′
2 = p
′′
2 = 0 . (81)
The corresponding conditional spectrum is given by
νE|QB ,PB → {n1, n2, n3, (1− T 2)V } ,
where
n1n2n3 =
[1 + T 3 + (1− T )(1 + T 2)W ]W
T (1 + T )
. (82)
This spectrum leads to the final asymptotic rate
R◭[Het2] = log 2T (1+T )e(1−T )[1+T 2+(1−T 2)W ]
+
3∑
i=1
g(ni)− 2g(W ) . (83)
Structure of two-mode attacks
Let us describe the effects of a general two-mode attack
when Alice and Bob adopt the hybrid protocol. In the
hybrid protocol, Bob sends a modulated pure state |ϕ〉B,
which is coherent for Het1,2 and squeezed for Hom1,2.
Then, Alice modulates this state by α in the ON config-
uration, while she detects |ϕ〉B and re-sends a new |ϕ′〉A
in the OFF configuration. In general, in a two-mode at-
tack, Eve can use a countable set of ancillas which can
always be partitioned in three blocks E = {E1, F, E2}
(see Fig. 6). However, such an attack can always be
reduced to the cascade form of Fig. 7. This is a triv-
ial consequence of the logical structure of the protocol,
where the backward path (labelled by 2) is always subse-
quent to the forward path (labelled by 1) and, therefore,
a first unitary interaction Uˆ can condition a second one
Vˆ , but the contrary is not possible. In the first uni-
tary Uˆ , two blocks of ancillas E1 and F interact with
the forward path (1). One output E1 is sent to the final
coherent detection while the other one F is taken as in-
put for the second unitary Vˆ . Such a unitary makes the
backward path (2) interact with F (coming from Uˆ) and
another block of fresh ancillas E2. The corresponding
outputs of F and E2 are then sent to the final coher-
ent detection. Note that such a description contains all
E+α
(1)
(2)
B
ϕ
E1 E2 F
E1 E2 F
ρ
B
(ON)
E1 E2 F
E1 E2 F
(1)
(2)
ρ
A
ρ
B
A
'ϕ
E
B
ϕ
(OFF)
FIG. 6: General two-mode attack against a hybrid protocol
(displayed in both the ON and OFF configuration). The two
paths of the quantum communication interact with a supply
of ancillas that can always be divided into three blocks E1, E2
and F .
the possible quantum and/or classical correlations that
Eve can create between the forward and backward paths
(both Gaussian and non-Gaussian).
In the OFF configuration, the first channel E1 :
|ϕ〉B 〈ϕ| → ρA is described by the Stinespring dilation
[44]
E1(|ϕ〉B 〈ϕ|) = TrE1F
[
UˆBE1F (|ϕ〉B 〈ϕ|
⊗ |0〉E1 〈0| ⊗ |0〉F 〈0|
)
Uˆ †BE1F
]
, (84)
while the second channel E2 : |ϕ′〉A 〈ϕ′| → ρB can be
expressed by the physical representation [45]
E2(|ϕ′〉A 〈ϕ′|) = TrE2F
[
VˆAE2F (|ϕ′〉A 〈ϕ′|
⊗ρF ⊗ |0〉E2 〈0|
)
Vˆ †AE2F
]
, (85)
where
ρF = TrBE1
[
UˆBE1F (|ϕ〉B 〈ϕ|
⊗ |0〉E1 〈0| ⊗ |0〉F 〈0|
)
Uˆ †BE1F
]
(86)
11
+α
U
V
E2
E2
(1)
(2)
ρ
A
ρ
B
(ON) E1 F
E1
F
F
B
ϕ
U
V
(1)
(2)
ρ
A
ρ
B
(OFF) E1 F
E2
E2E1 F
F
B
ϕ
A
'ϕ
FIG. 7: Cascade form of the two-mode attack. In the first
unitary Uˆ , two blocks of ancillas E1 and F interact with the
forward path (labelled by 1). One output E1 is sent to the
final coherent detection while the other one F is taken as input
for the second unitary Vˆ . Such a unitary makes the backward
path (labelled by 2) interact with F (coming from Uˆ) and
another block of fresh ancillas E2. The corresponding outputs
of F and E2 are then sent to the final coherent detection.
is the (generally mixed) state coming from the attack of
the first channel. In the ON configuration, the global
map E2 : |ϕ〉B 〈ϕ| → ρB is equal to
E2(|ϕ〉B 〈ϕ|) = TrE
[
VˆBE (|ϕ〉B 〈ϕ| ⊗ |0〉E 〈0|) Vˆ †BE
]
,
(87)
where |0〉
E
〈0| := |0〉E1 〈0| ⊗ |0〉E2 〈0| ⊗ |0〉F 〈0| and
VˆBE := VˆBE2F DˆB(α)UˆBE1F . (88)
Notice that the Stinespring dilation of Eq. (87) is unique
up to a local unitary transformation UˆE acting on the
output ancilla modes. In our description of the attack
(see Fig. 7) such a local unitary is included in the opti-
mization of the final coherent detection.
From Eq. (88), it is clear that Eve’s attack is void of
quantum correlations if
VˆBE2F = VˆBE2 ⊗ VˆF , (89)
or
UˆBE1F = UˆBE1 ⊗ UˆF . (90)
In such a case in fact the two unitaries Uˆ and Vˆ are no
longer coupled by the F ancillas. Let us assume one of
the incoherence conditions of Eq. (89) and (90). Then,
we can group the ancillas into two disjoint blocks E1 =
{E1, F} and E2 = {E2} if Eq. (89) holds, or E1 = {E1}
and E2 = {E2, F} if Eq. (90) holds. In both cases the
one-mode channels of Eqs. (84) and (85) are expressed
by the Stinespring dilations
E1(|ϕ〉B 〈ϕ|) = TrE1
[
UˆBE1
(|ϕ〉B 〈ϕ| ⊗ |0〉E1 〈0|) Uˆ †BE1
]
,
(91)
and
E2(|ϕ′〉A 〈ϕ′|) = TrE2
[
VˆAE2 (|ϕ′〉A 〈ϕ′|
⊗ |0〉
E2
〈0|) Vˆ †AE2
]
, (92)
while the two-mode channel E2 is expressed by Eq. (87)
with
VˆBE := VˆBE2DˆB(α)UˆBE1 . (93)
Now, one can easily check that Eq. (93) is equivalent to
the decomposability condition
E2 = E2 ◦ Eα ◦ E1 . (94)
This can be easily verified by inserting Eqs. (91) and (92)
into the right hand side of Eq. (94) and resorting to the
uniqueness property of the Stinespring dilation.
Once the presence of quantum correlations between the
paths has been excluded, every residual classical correla-
tion can be excluded by symmetrizing the forward and
backward channels, i.e., by setting E1 = E2, which is
equivalent to relating the two unitaries Uˆ and Vˆ by a par-
tial isometry. In conclusion, the verification of the condi-
tion E2 = E ◦ Eα ◦ E by Alice and Bob explicitly excludes
every sort of quantum/classical correlation between the
two paths of the quantum communication. Moreover,
such a verification is relatively easy in case of Gaussian
attacks, since the corresponding Gaussian channels can
be completely reconstructed from the analysis of the first
two statistical moments.
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